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Judge Posner may have coined the phrase “cat’s paw” in the 1991 
Seventh Circuit case Shager v. Upjohn Company,
1
 but the phrase has a 
much deeper history. It originated as an Aesop fable
2
 and later 
transformed into a 1600s fable by Jean de La Fontaine, titled “The 
Monkey and the Cat.”
3
 In the fable, the monkey yearns for chestnuts 
roasting over an open flame; not wanting to burn himself, he 
convinces a cat to reach into the fire and retrieve the piping hot 
chestnuts.
4
 The unfortunate cat relentlessly scoops the chestnuts from 
the fire, only to find that upon completion, the monkey has devoured 




                                                 
 J.D. candidate, May 2013, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of 
Technology; B.A., 2007, Vanderbilt University.  
1
 Shager v. Upjohn Company, 913 F.2d 398, 405 (7th Cir. 1990). 
2
 Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 131 S. Ct. 1186, 1190 n.1 (2011). 
3
 Julie M. Covel, Comment, The Supreme Court Writes A Fractured Fable of 
the Cat's Paw Theory in Staub v. Proctor Hospital [Staub v. Proctor Hospital, 131 S. 
Ct. 1186 (2011)], 51 WASHBURN L.J. 159, 159 n.2 (2011).  
4
 Id. at 160. 
5
 Id.  
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This fable continues its transformation, as now its story serves as 
an analogy to a type of liability in employment discrimination cases. 
Specifically, a “cat’s paw” situation occurs when (1) a final decision-
maker relies on a subordinate’s recommendation; (2) that 
recommendation is motivated by discriminatory animus; and (3) the 
final decision-maker uses the biased recommendation to take an 
adverse employment action against another employee.
6
 The final 
decision-maker, or the person within the company with the authority to 
implement an adverse employment action, symbolizes the cat, while 
the employee whispering his or her biased remarks in the decision-
maker’s ear represents the monkey.
7
  
In 2011, the Supreme Court endorsed employer liability under 
“cat’s paw,”
8
 and in the process established a new approach to 
answering the question of when an employer can be “held liable for 
employment discrimination based on the discriminatory animus of an 
employee who influenced, but did not make, the ultimate employment 
decision.”
9
 The Court evaluated “cat’s paw” in the context of the 
Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 
1994 (“USERRA”),
10
 but the Court ensured lower courts would 
broadly interpret its holding by noting how similar USERRA is to Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”).
11
 Applying “cat’s 
                                                 
6
 Smith v. Bray, 681 F.3d 888, 897 (2012).  
7
 Covel, supra note 3, at 159-160.  
8
 Staub, 131 S. Ct. at 1193 (finding that the employer is at fault because one of 
its agents committed an action based on discriminatory animus that was intended to 
cause, and did in fact cause, an adverse employment decision).  
9
 Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 131 S. Ct. 1186, 1187 (2011).  
10
 38 U.S.C. § 4311(a) (1996) (“A person who is a member of, applies to be a 
member of, performs, has performed, applies to perform, or has an obligation to 
perform service in a uniformed service shall not be denied initial employment, 
reemployment, retention in employment, promotion, or any benefit of employment 
by an employer on the basis of that membership, application for membership, 
performance of service, application for service, or obligation.”); Id. at § 4311(c) 
(stating when an employer is considered to have engaged in actions prohibited by the 
statute). See infra notes 54, 118.  
11
 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1991) (stating when an employer’s employment 
practice is illegal); Id. at § 2000e-2(m) (stating that “an unlawful employment 
2
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paw” to the facts, the Court found that the nondecision-making 
employees were motivated by hostility towards the plaintiff’s military 
obligations, and that their actions served as causal factors behind the 
decision-maker’s choice to terminate the plaintiff.
12
  
Staub offered the Court an opportunity to clear up the confusion 
surrounding the circuit courts’ differing approaches to subordinate 
bias;
13
 however, the Court chose instead to create a new framework.
14
 
The Court held that that “if a supervisor performs an act motivated by 
antimilitary animus that is intended by the supervisor to cause an 
adverse employment action, and if that act is a proximate cause of the 
ultimate employment action, then the employer is liable under 
USERRA.”
15
 This holding laid out for the circuit courts a test under 
which to evaluate a “cat’s paw” liability claim. This test focused on 
two elements: (1) whether a supervisor’s act motivated by a 
discriminatory animus is intended by that supervisor to cause an 
adverse employment action, and (2) whether that act is a proximate 
cause of the ultimate employment action.
16
 
Along with Title VII and the USERRA, courts apply “cat’s paw” 
liability to other statutes including § 1981
17
 and § 1983.
18
 In particular, 
“at least five circuits have indicated that a cat’s paw theory would 
support imposing individual liability under § 1983 on subordinate 
governmental employees with unlawful motives who cause the real 
decision-makers to retaliate.”
19
 The Seventh Circuit recently expanded 
individual liability to § 1981 claims in Smith v. Bray,
20
 focusing on 
                                                                                                                   
practice is established when the complaining party demonstrates that race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice, 
even though other factors also motivated the practice.”).  
12
 Staub, 131 S. Ct. at 1194.  
13
 See discussion infra Part I.B.   
14
 Covel, supra note 3, at 160. 
15
 Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 131 S. Ct. 1186, 1194 (2011) (emphasis in original). 
16
 Id.  
17
 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1991).  
18
 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1996).  
19
 Smith v. Bray, 681 F.3d 888, 898 (7th Cir. 2012) (emphasis in original).  
20
 Id.  
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liability of the non-decision-maker and whether his or her actions 
“were a ‘causal factor,’ based on common-law proximate cause 
principles, in [another employee’s] termination decision.”
21
The court 
found that individual liability is appropriate in § 1981 cases when a 
“subordinate with a retaliatory motive… caus[es] the employer to 
retaliate against another employee.”
22
  
The issue this Note addresses is whether it is proper to hold an 
individual liable in a § 1981 suit. This Note will argue that the Seventh 
Circuit is correct in its decision to create liability for an individual 
employee under § 1981.
23
 Part I of the Note reviews the origin and 
history of the “cat’s paw” legal doctrine prior to the Smith decision. 
Part II analyzes the Seventh Circuit’s Smith decision and its formula 
for expanding “cat’s paw” to include holding individual employees 
liable to a plaintiff. Part III argues (1) why this expansion is proper; 
(2) what potential implications the Smith individual liability rule will 
have on the law, on employment lawsuits and on corporations; and (3) 
a criticism of the Seventh Circuit’s decision.  
 
I. HISTORY OF THE “CAT’S PAW” DOCTRINE 
 
 Before its expansion to individual liability under § 1981,
24
 the 
“cat’s paw” liability doctrine had a tumultuous history. First coined by 
Judge Posner in 1990,
25
 the circuits took three distinct views
26
 on 
when a corporation is liable under the doctrine before the Supreme 
Court examined “cat’s paw.”
27
 Overturning a Seventh Circuit decision, 
the Supreme Court laid out its own test to determine when an 
employer is liable under the “cat’s paw” doctrine.
28
 This section 
                                                 
21
 Id. at 900. 
22
 Id. at 899.  
23
 Id.  
24
 Id.  
25
 See infra Part I.A.  
26
 See infra Part I.B. 
27
 Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 131 S. Ct. 1186 (2011). 
28
 See infra text accompanying notes 55-58.  
4
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explores the doctrine’s history until the Seventh Circuit’s Smith 
decision. 
 
A. The Doctrine is Born 
 
In Shager v. Upjohn Company, Judge Posner first compared the 
“cat’s paw” fable to an employment law situation, a situation in which 
a biased subordinate influences a decision-maker’s choice to take an 
adverse employment action against another employee.
29
 In that case, 
plaintiff Shager appealed the dismissal of his suit under the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”)
30
 against his employer, 
Asgrow Seed Company (“Asgrow”), and codefendant Upjohn 
Company.
31
 Asgrow terminated Shager, who was over fifty years old, 
in favor of keeping a twenty-nine year old employee, Schradle, despite 
Shager out-performing Schradle in a more difficult territory.
32
 The 
Seventh Circuit considered whether the bias of Shager’s supervisor, 
Lehnst, against older workers could be imputed to Asgrow.
33
 The court 
noted that Lehnst did not fire Shager; rather, Asgrow’s Career Path 
Committee did.
34
 Shager alleged that Lehnst set him up for failure by 
assigning him a difficult territory to succeed in and by explaining 
Shager’s performance to the Career Path Committee in an unfavorable 
light.
35
 Posner stated that if the Career Path Committee “acted as the 
conduit of Lehnst’s prejudice- his cat’s-paw- the innocence of its 
members would not spare the company from liability.”
36
 The phrase 
                                                 
29
 Shager v. Upjohn Company, 913 F.2d 398, 405 (7th Cir. 1990) (“If [the 
Career Path Committee] acted as the conduit of Lehnst's prejudice-his cat's-paw-the 
innocence of its members would not spare the company from liability.”). 
30
 29 U.S.C. §§ 621- 634 (1996).  
31
Shager, 913 F.2d at 399. 
32
 Id.  
33
 Id. at 404.  
34
 Id. at 405. 
35
 Shager v. Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398, 405 (7th Cir. 1990). 
36
 Id.  
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“cat’s paw” caught on, and currently every appellate court as well as 




B. Inconsistent Treatment Among Districts 
 
Before Staub, the circuit courts’ “cat’s paw” liability tests varied 
drastically. The circuits differed primarily on the following: (1) the 
burden of causation that a plaintiff had to meet to attach liability to an 
employer; (2) approaches on agency in relation to “cat’s paw” liability; 
and (3) the impact of and standard for an employer’s independent 
investigation.
38
 These differing approaches created confusion as to 
when employers were liable for subordinate employee’s influence on a 
decision-maker to take an adverse employment action against another 
employee. 
The various standards employed by circuit courts before Staub fell 
into three categories based on the difficulty level a plaintiff faced in 
bringing a motion for summary judgment: lenient, strict, and 
intermediate.
39
 The most commonly applied standard was the lenient 
standard, under which an employer was liable when a biased 
subordinate influenced an adverse action by the ultimate decision-
maker.
40
 First, in the 1990’s, the Seventh Circuit applied the lenient 
standard, finding that, in order to overcome a motion for summary 
judgment, a plaintiff only needed to show that “an employee with 
discriminatory animus provided factual information or other input that 
                                                 
37
 Stephen F. Befort & Alison L. Olig, Within in Grasp of the Cat's Paw: 
Delineating the Scope of Subordinate Bias Liability Under Federal 
Antidiscrimination Statutes, 60 S.C. L. Rev. 383, 385-386 (2008). 
38
 Covel, supra note 3, at 167-68. 
39
 Befort & Olig, supra note 37, at 386.  
40
 Id. See, e.g., Shager v. Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398, 405 (7th Cir. 1990); 
Abramson v. William Paterson Coll. of N.J., 260 F.3d 265, 286 (3d Cir. 2001); 
Santiago-Ramos v. Centennial P.R. Wireless Corp., 217 F.3d 46, 55 (1st Cir. 2000); 
Griffin v. Wash. Convention Ctr., 142 F.3d 1308, 1312 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Christian v. 
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 252 F.3d 862, 877 (6th Cir. 2001); Rose v. N.Y. City Bd. of 
Educ., 257 F.3d 156, 163 (2d Cir. 2001); Bergene v. Salt River Project Agric. 
Improvement and Power Dist., 272 F.3d 1136, 1141 (9th Cir. 2001); EEOC v. 
Liberal R-II Sch. Dist., 314 F.3d 920, 924 (8th Cir. 2002). 
6
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may have affected the adverse employment action.”
41
 While there was 
some variety between the circuits that applied this approach, one 
continuing theme emerged: any influence caused by subordinate bias 
established a causal link to an employer’s liability.
42
 Therefore, under 
the lenient standard a plaintiff did not have to cross a high hurdle to 
get past a defendant’s summary judgment motion. 
On the other end of the spectrum, the Fourth Circuit applied the 
strict standard. This standard relied on two requirements. First, the 
strict standard looked more so on agency principles, so that an 
employer was liable for actions of subordinates with supervisory 
authority.
43
 Second, the strict standard required “but-for” causation.
44
 
In Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Management Incorporated, the 
court emphasized the circuit’s choice to take a lone approach and 
“focus upon the language of the discrimination statutes and Supreme 
Court precedents.”
45
 The court found that an employer is “liable not 
for the improperly motivated person who merely influences the 
decision, but for the person who in reality makes the decision,” which 
encompassed actual decision-makers for the employer.
46
 
Lastly, two circuits introduced intermediate approaches after Hill. 
The Tenth Circuit decided that the key issue in the “cat’s paw” debate 
between the circuits was “whether the biased subordinate’s 
discriminatory reports, recommendation, or other actions caused the 
                                                 
41
 Dey v. Colt Constr. & Dev. Co., 28 F.3d 1446, 1459 (7th Cir. 1994). See also 
Abramson v. William Paterson Coll. of N.J., 260 F.3d 265, 286 (3d Cir. 2001) 
(Finding that “cat’s paw” liability results when “those exhibiting discriminatory 
animus influenced or participated in the decision to terminate.”).  
42
 Befort & Olig, supra note 37, at 392. See also Llampallas v. Mini-Circuits, 
Lab, Inc., 163 F.3d 1236, 1249 (11th Cir. 1998) (“[T]he harasser is the 
decisionmaker, and the titular ‘decisionmaker’ is a mere conduit for the harasser’s 
discriminatory animus.”) (emphasis in original). 
43
 Befort & Olig, supra note 37, at 395.  
44
 Id.  
45
 Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt. Inc., 354 F.3d 277, 290 (4th Cir. 
2004). 
46
 Id. at 291.  
7
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 and that to find liability, there had to be 
a causal connection.
48
 The Seventh Circuit transitioned from its 
previously lenient approach and attempted to clarify its position on 
“cat’s paw” liability. On one hand, the court found that a plaintiff must 
establish that the subordinate employee had enough influence to 
function as a decision-maker;
49
 on the other hand, the court allowed an 
employer to avert liability despite this influence being present if the 
employer conducted an independent investigation into the plaintiff’s 
claims.
50
 This new, intermediate approach is reflected in the Seventh 
Circuit’s Staub decision. 
 
C. 7th Circuit: Staub v. Proctor Hospital  
 
In 2009, the Seventh Circuit solidified its acceptance of the 
intermediate “cat’s paw” liability standard in its Staub v. Proctor 
Hospital decision.
51
 The court established the rule that “where a 
decision maker is not wholly dependent on a single source of 
information, but instead conducts its own investigation into the facts 
relevant to the decision, the employer is not liable for an employee’s 
submission of misinformation to the decision maker.”
52
 Thus, the 
Seventh Circuit employed the singular influence test, stating that “cat’s 




                                                 
47
 EEOC v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of L.A., 450 F.3d 476, 488 (10th Cir. 
2006) (citing English v. Colo. Dep’t of Corr., 248 F.3d 1002, 1011(10th Cir. 2001)), 




 Brewer v. Bd. of Trustees of the Univ. of Ill., 479 F.3d 908, 917 (7th Cir. 
2007). 
50
 Id. at 920. 
51
 Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 560 F.3d 647, 656 (7th Cir. 2009) rev’d and 
remanded, 131 S. Ct. 1186 (2011). 
52
 Id. (quoting Brewer, 479 F.3d at 918). 
53
 Id. at 659. 
8
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D. The Supreme Court’s Rejection of the Seventh Circuit’s 
Decision 
 
In 2007, the Supreme Court passed on an opportunity to clarify 
the “cat’s paw” doctrine, endorsing instead a general concept of “cat’s 
paw” liability instead of discussing the range of circumstances for 
employer liability.
54
 However, the Court revisited the doctrine when it 
overruled the Seventh Circuit in 2011.
55
 The Court defined “cat’s paw” 
as applying when a “company official who makes the decision to take 
an adverse employment action . . . has no discriminatory animus but is 
influenced by previous company action that is the product of a like 
animus in someone else.”
56
 Under the Court’s formula, a finding of 
“cat’s paw” liability requires that the biased supervisor intend an 
adverse employment action to occur
57
 and that this supervisor’s action 
be “a causal factor” of the adverse employment action.
58
 While the 
plaintiff in Staub sued the defendants under USERRA, the Court noted 
that the statute is “very similar to Title VII.”
59
 
The Court declined to adopt the Seventh Circuit’s rule that an 
independent investigation into the allegations of discriminatory bias is 
enough to negate the prior discrimination’s effect.
60
 If the investigation 
utilized facts provided by the biased supervisor, the Court reasoned, 
then the employer essentially allowed that supervisor to participate in 
and taint the investigation.
61
 Regardless of an independent 
investigation, the employer is liable to the plaintiff because the 
                                                 
54
 Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000). 
55
 Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 131 S. Ct. 1186, 1194 (2011). 
56
 Id. at 1191. 
57
 Id. at 1191-1192. 
58
 Id. at 1192-1193. The Court added a footnote after its holding, stating that 
“the employer would be liable only when the supervisor acts within the scope of his 
employment, or when the supervisor acts outside the scope of his employment and 
liability would be imputed to the employer under traditional agency principles.” Id. 
at 1194 n.4. 
59
 Id. at 1191. 
60
 Id. at 1193. 
61
 Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 131 S. Ct. 1186, 1193 (2011). 
9
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decision-maker and the biased supervisor are its agents
62
 acting within 
the scope of their employment.
63
 
Although the Court laid down a test for the circuits, it left two 
areas open for interpretation. The Court chose not to address whether 
an employer is liable if a co-worker influences the decision-maker to 
make an adverse employment decision.
64
 Further, the Court made no 
findings regarding whether an employer would have an affirmative 
defense to a “cat’s paw” action if the plaintiff failed to take advantage 
of the employer’s grievance process.
65
 While the Court finally 
acknowledged that the “cat’s paw” doctrine exists as good law, areas 
still remained open for the circuits to creatively interpret at their 
leisure. 
II. SMITH V. BRAY 
 
 On an issue of first impression, the Seventh Circuit sought to 
answer “whether the subordinate with a retaliatory motive may be 
individually liable under § 1981 for causing the employer to retaliate 
against another employee.”
66
 The case came to the Seventh Circuit on 
an appeal from the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
67
 
The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of both 
defendants,
68
 and the plaintiff, Darrell Smith (“Smith”),
69
 appealed. 
The claim at issue was Smith’s § 1981 retaliation claim.
70
 When 
Smith’s suit reached the Seventh Circuit on appeal, only one 
individual, Denise Bray (“Bray”), remained a defendant.
71
 This section 




 Id. at 1194 n.4.  
64




 Smith v. Bray, 681 F.3d 888, 899 (7th Cir. 2012). 
67
 See infra text accompanying note 72.  
68
 See infra text accompanying note 118.  
69
 See infra text accompanying note 72. 
70
 See infra text accompanying notes 74-75. 
71
 See infra text accompanying note 120. 
10
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discusses the history and facts of the case, as well as the Seventh 
Circuit’s analysis of individual liability under the “cat’s paw” doctrine. 
 
A. Origination of Smith v. Bray: District Court  
 
1. Procedural History 
 
Plaintiff Smith filed his complaint in the Northern District of 
Illinois, Eastern Division, on June 15, 2009.
72
 He filed his complaint 
against companies Lydondell Chemical Company (“Lyondell”) and 
Equistar Chemicals, LP (“Equistar”), and against individuals James 
Bianchetta (“Bianchetta”) and Bray.
73
 Count I of Smith’s complaint 
asserted a claim for racial discrimination against Bianchetta pursuant 
to § 1981.
74
 In Count II, he asserted § 1981 claim for retaliation 
against both Bianchetta and Bray.
75
 Smith was later forced to dismiss 
his complaint against Lyondell and Equistar because the companies 
filed for bankruptcy, and his complaint violated the Bankruptcy Code’s 
automatic stay.
76
 The case then came before the United States District 









 He worked as a Process Technician 
for Equistar from November 6, 2000,
79
 until Equistar terminated his 
                                                 
72
 Smith v. Bianchetta, 803 F. Supp. 2d 877, 880 (N.D. Ill. 2011), aff'd sub 




 Id. at 887. 
75




 Id.  
78
 Smith v. Bianchetta, 803 F. Supp. 2d 877, 881 (N.D. Ill. 2011), aff'd sub 
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employment on August 4, 2006.
80
 Bianchetta acted as Smith’s 
supervisor, and Bray was a Human Resources manager.
81
 The 
controversy began when, under doctor’s orders, Smith stayed home 
from work because of stress.
82
 He applied for short-term disability to 
cover this time.
83
 Concentra, a third party firm where Smith filed his 
disability request, attempted to speak with Smith’s doctor regarding 
his application, but did not receive sufficient information.
84
 Therefore, 
Concentra could not issue a recommendation on Smith’s claim.
85
 
Smith’s doctor recommended he take another thirty days off from 




Because of Concentra’s denial, Richard Purgason (“Purgason”), a 
Plant Manager, considered Smith’s absence to be without leave and 
requested Smith’s termination.
87
 Bray signed a letter to Smith, dated 
August 4, 2006, effectively terminating his employment for job 
abandonment in violation of an Equistar policy.
88
 
Smith argued that he missed work because he experienced stress 
as a result of continuous racial discrimination from Equistar 
employees.
89
 For example, Smith was assigned extra duties;
90
 told he 
was not doing his job;
91
 complained about via an anonymous hotline 
                                                 
80
 Id. at 882.  
81
 Id. at 881.  
82
 Id.  
83
 Id.  
84
 Smith v. Bianchetta, 803 F. Supp. 2d 877, 881 (N.D. Ill. 2011), aff'd sub 
nom. Smith v. Bray, 681 F.3d 888 (7th Cir. 2012). 
85
 Id.  
86




 Id.  
89
 Id. at 883. 
90
 Smith v. Bianchetta, 803 F. Supp. 2d 877, 883 (N.D. Ill. 2011), aff'd sub 
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for using incorrect materials;
92
 and involved in a verbal altercation 
regarding his responsiveness to an alarm.
93
 Moreover, someone left a 
note on his desk saying he did very little work.
94
 Controversy also 
surrounded a special project Smith began, and later stopped, working 
on.
95
 When Bianchetta requested Smith’s work on this project, he 
found that items were deleted and issued Smith a warning for 
removing this information.
96




Along with alleging that the above incidents occurred because of 
his race, Smith asserted that Bianchetta harassed him and made racist 
remarks about him, both of which escalated with time.
98
 For instance, 
when Smith complained about not receiving the highest pay possible, 
Bianchetta allegedly “told him it was because black people are not 
smart enough for a promotion.”
99
 According to coworkers’ 
testimonies, Bianchetta stated that he “got [Smith]” around the time 
that Smith was terminated.
100
 Further, when Smith retained a lawyer, 
Bianchetta said that “it was the worst thing [Smith] could have done, 




Smith complained to Equistar about Bianchetta.
102
 Bray was 
aware of Smith’s numerous complaints, and she investigated them; 
however, she did not speak with the corporate Human Resources 








 Id. at 884. 
96
 Smith v. Bianchetta, 803 F. Supp. 2d 877, 884 (N.D. Ill. 2011), aff'd sub 
nom. Smith v. Bray, 681 F.3d 888 (7th Cir. 2012). 
97
 Id.  
98
 Id. at 884-885.  
99
 Id. at 884.  
100
 Id. at 885.  
101
 Id.  
102
 Smith v. Bianchetta, 803 F. Supp. 2d 877, 885 (N.D. Ill. 2011), aff'd sub 
nom. Smith v. Bray, 681 F.3d 888 (7th Cir. 2012). 
13
Bochenek: The Cat's Revenge: Individual Liability Under the Cat's Paw Doctr
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2012




Department as company policy mandated.
103
 Bray stated she was not 
involved in deciding Smith’s discipline,
104
 and that her role did not 
allow her to make termination decisions.
105
 However, Bray wrote a 
first-person report requesting Smith’s termination and Pergason 
testified that Human Resources managers were involved to some 
degree in termination decisions.
106
 Bray stated her involvement was 




3. District Court Analysis 
 
The District Court ultimately determined that Smith met his 
burden on his retaliation claim to overcome summary judgment 
against Bianchetta.
108
 Count I of Smith’s complaint alleged racial 
discrimination pursuant to § 1981 against Bianchetta,
109
 and the court 
allowed the case to continue because it found direct evidence to 
support Smith’s claim when viewing the factual disputes in his 
favor.
110
 Smith’s hostile-environment claim was also allowed to move 
forward because whether it was brought within the statute of 
limitations was a jury question.
111
 Smith’s retaliation claim against 
Bianchetta in Count II moved forward as well.
112
 
In addition to his claims against Bianchetta, Smith brought a 
retaliation claim against Bray, alleging that Bray terminated him for 
complaining about both discrimination and a hostile work 
                                                 
103




 Id. at 886.  
106
 Id.  
107
 Id.   
108
 Smith v. Bianchetta, 803 F. Supp. 2d 877, 890 (N.D. Ill. 2011), aff'd sub 
nom. Smith v. Bray, 681 F.3d 888 (7th Cir. 2012). 
109
 Id. at 888. 
110




 Id. at 890.  
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 However, this claim ultimately failed because the 
court excluded from evidence a statement made by Bianchetta that he 
and Bray wanted to fire Smith as soon as he took sick leave.
114
 Smith 
also argued Bray participated in decisions to terminate him.
115
 
However, insufficient evidence existed to show a factual dispute, and 
Smith failed to prove Bray caused his termination because of his 
complaints.
116
 Further, the District Court found that Smith’s claim 
failed under the indirect method of proof because he did not find 
another similarly situated individual who was treated more 
favorably.
117





B. Smith v. Bray is appealed to the Seventh Circuit 
 
1. Seventh Circuit Opinion 
 
Plaintiff Smith appealed the District Court’s holding that granted 
Bray’s summary judgment motion.
119
 Due to a prior settlement with 
Bianchetta, Bray appeared as the only defendant before the Seventh 
Circuit.
120
 The Seventh Circuit was thus confronted with a case where 
the plaintiff brought suit, not against an employer, but instead against 
two individuals.
121
 The Seventh Circuit sought to define “what is 
needed to prove that a particular individual is legally responsible for 
the alleged discrimination and/or retaliation.”
122
 The court wanted to 
                                                 
113
 Id.  
114
 Smith v. Bianchetta, 803 F. Supp. 2d 877, 890 (N.D. Ill. 2011), aff'd sub 
nom. Smith v. Bray, 681 F.3d 888 (7th Cir. 2012). 
115
 Id. at 891.  
116




 Id. at 892.  
119
 Smith v. Bray, 681 F.3d 888, 892 (7th Cir. 2012). 
120
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know if Smith “presented sufficient evidence: (1) that Bray caused 




The court began its analysis with a review of § 1981’s past,
124
 
stating that “[t]he Supreme Court has held that § 1981 authorizes 
claims for retaliation, if one person takes action against another for 
asserting the right to substantive contractual equality provided by 
§ 1981.”
125
 The court then laid out what evidence Smith needed to 
produce in order to avoid summary judgment under a direct method of 
proof.
126
 Essentially, Smith needed to present direct evidence of 
“(1) his statutorily protected activity; (2) a materially adverse action 
taken by Bray; and (3) a causal connection between the two.”
127
  
Smith satisfied the first element by demonstrating that he 
complained about discrimination.
128
 Moving to the second element, 
because Smith sued Bray in her individual capacity, the court 
examined Bray’s participation in Smith’s termination.
129
 Here, the 
court delved into the “cat’s paw” doctrine.
130
 The court began 
exploring the doctrine by reiterating the Supreme Court’s comparison 
in Staub, that even though the Court endorsed “cat’s paw” employer 
liability under USERRA,
 
circuits have also assumed that the theory 
supports holding an employer liable under § 1981 and § 1983.
131
 
The court then introduced the concept of individual liability, using 
§ 1983 as an example of how individual liability can fall under the 
                                                 
123
 Id.  
124
 42 U.S.C. § 1981(1991). See Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 541 U.S. 
369, 383 (2004) (The 1991 Act “defin[ed] the key ‘make and enforce contracts’ 
language in § 1981 to include the ‘termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of all 
benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual relationship.’”). 
125
 Smith v. Bray, 681 F.3d 888, 896 (7th Cir. 2012). 
126
 Id.  
127
 Id.  
128
 Id.  
129
 Id. at 896-888. 
130
 Id.  
131
 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1996). Smith v. Bray, 681 F.3d 888, 897 (7th Cir. 2012). 
See supra text accompanying notes 10-11, 54. 
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“cat’s paw” doctrine. Under this statute, “at least five circuits have 
indicated that a cat’s paw theory would support imposing individual 
liability under § 1983.”
132
 After solidifying that individual liability is 
appropriate under § 1983, the court moved to its main issue. The issue 
addressed was an issue of first impression: “whether the subordinate 
with a retaliatory motive may be individually liable under § 1981 for 
causing the employer to retaliate against another employee.”
133
 The 
Seventh Circuit answered yes.
134
  
The court succinctly explained why individual liability can flow 
from the “cat’s paw” employer liability analysis. The Seventh Circuit 
reasoned that similar standards are used for § 1981, § 1983, and Title 
VII cases, so an individual should be held liable for conduct under 
§ 1981 that an employer would be liable for under Title VII or 
§ 1981.
135
 Further, the court thought the concept of fairness supported 
holding the “malicious ‘monkey’” responsible for his or her actions 
instead of making the “‘hapless cat,’” the employer, solely liable.
136
 
  Applying its “cat’s paw” theory to the facts in the case, the 
Seventh Circuit asked whether Bray “intentionally helped cause the 
adverse employment action against [Smith]” and “whether the non-
decision-maker’s actions were a ‘casual factor,’ based on common-law 
proximate cause principles, in the termination decision.”
137
 Smith 
produced sufficient evidence to overcome summary judgment on both 
factors, meeting the burden of showing that Bray participated in an 
adverse action against him for purposes of § 1981.
138
 
Despite overcoming the “cat’s paw” hurdle to hold Bray liable in 
her individual capacity, the Seventh Circuit ultimately agreed with the 
                                                 
132
 Smith, 681 F.3d at 898 (emphasis in original).  
133
 Id. at 899.  
134
 Id.  
135
 Id.  
136
 Id.  
137
 Smith v. Bray, 681 F.3d 888, 899-900 (7th Cir. 2012). 
138
 Id. at 900. Bray was involved at every level of Smith’s workplace 
controversies and a reasonable juror could believe that the ultimate decision-maker, 
Purgason, relied on Bray’s input when he decided to terminate Smith’s employment. 
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District Court that Smith’s claim failed.
139
 Smith had to show that his 
complaints to Bray about Bianchetta were a “substantial or motivating 
factor” in Bray’s decision to recommend that Perguson terminate 
Smith.
140
 Smith could not adequately support this element with 
admissible evidence and therefore, his retaliation claim failed.
141
 
Despite Smith’s inability to prove this element, the court 
described, for future plaintiffs, what needs to be demonstrated to 
survive summary judgment. First, a plaintiff could show direct 
evidence, or “something akin to an admission,”
142
 made by the 
subordinate employee about his or her retaliatory motive or animus.
143
 
Additionally, a plaintiff could show a “‘convincing mosaic’ of 
circumstantial evidence” of the subordinate employee’s retaliatory 
animus that “would suggest to a reasonable juror that she tried to get 
him fired because he had complained about discrimination.”
144
 For 
example, had Smith offered evidence that Bray turned a blind eye to 
Smith’s racial discrimination complaints, Smith would have satisfied 
the intent element.
145
 Ultimately, the court held that Smith had “not 
offered sufficient admissible evidence to allow a reasonable jury to 
find that [Bray] was motivated by a desire to retaliate against him for 




                                                 
139
 Id. (“[W]e agree with the district court that there simply is not enough 
admissible evidence showing that Bray acted with a retaliatory motive, i.e., that she 
caused Smith’s termination because he had complained about discrimination.”). 
140
 Id. (quoting Culver v. Gorman & Co., 416 F.3d 540, 545 (7th Cir. 2005)). 
141
 Id. at 901. 
142
 Id. at 900. 
143




 Id. at 906. 
146
 Id. at 892. 
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2. Areas Left Open for Interpretation  
 
Following in the Supreme Court’s footsteps,
147
 the Seventh 
Circuit did not address the issue of whether an employee would be 
held liable if a co-worker, not a supervisor, acted with discriminatory 
animus and caused an adverse employment action. However, there is 
evidence that the distinction between the two is of little significance. 
In March of 2012, Judge Posner stated: 
 
In employment discrimination law the “cat's paw” metaphor 
refers to a situation in which an employee is fired or 
subjected to some other adverse employment action by a 
supervisor who himself has no discriminatory motive, but 
who has been manipulated by a subordinate who does have 
such a motive and intended to bring about the adverse 
employment action. So if for example the subordinate has 
told the supervisor that the employee in question is a thief, 
but as the subordinate well knows she is not, the fact that the 
supervisor has no reason to doubt the truthfulness of the 
accusation, and having no doubt fires her, does not exonerate 





Judge Posner’s use of the word “subordinate” as opposed to 
“supervisor” can be interpreted as a sign from the court that in fact, the 
employee can be a co-worker, and that holding a supervisory position 
is not a pre-requisite that a plaintiff must meet before he or she can 
pursue “cat’s paw” liability.
149
 While this example relates to employer 
                                                 
147
 The Seventh Circuit’s failure to address this issue is similar to the Supreme 
Court’s decision to not address whether an employer is liable if the employee 
harboring a discriminatory bias is a supervisor or a c-worker. See supra text 
accompanying note 64. 
148
 Cook v. IPC Int'l Corp., 673 F.3d 625, 628 (7th Cir. Mar. 8, 2012) 
(emphasis added).  
149
 See Johnson v. Koppers, Inc., 10 C 3404, 2012 WL 1906448, at *7 (N.D. 
Ill. May 25, 2012). 
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liability, the Seventh Circuit in Smith used the word “subordinate” in 




and in two 
footnotes.
152
 The court’s decision to use “subordinate” rather than 
“supervisor” is indicative of the position that liability is not limited to 
supervisors.  
 
III. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT CORRECTLY EXPANDED 
“CAT’S PAW” LIABILITY 
 
 The Seventh Circuit correctly expanded “cat’s paw” liability to 
hold not only an employer, but also an individual, liable in a § 1981 
retaliation claim. Both § 1981’s history
153
 and similarity to 
§ 1983,
154
along with a notion of fairness,
155
 support the Seventh 
Circuit’s conclusion. The impact of this conclusion will expand who a 
plaintiff can bring suit against in the future, however, how far that 
expansion will go depends on (1) whether the defendant must be a 
supervisor to be liable; and (2) whether a corporation’s status as 
judgment-proof has any effect on whether an individual is liable.
156
 
Corporations will first feel the case’s impact because their training 
programs will need to reflect the possibility of employee liability.
157
 
                                                 
150
 Smith v. Bray, 681 F.3d 888, 899 (7th Cir. 2012) (“This case presents a 
related but distinct question of first impression: whether the subordinate with a 
retaliatory motive may be individually liable under § 1981 for causing the employer 
to retaliate against another employee.”) (emphasis added). 
151
 Id. (“The cat's paw theory can support individual liability under § 1981 for 
a subordinate employee who intentionally causes a decision-maker to take adverse 
action against another employee in retaliation for statutorily protected activity.”) 
(emphasis added).  
152
 Id. at 897 n.3 (stating that “cat’s paw” liability applies when a biased 
subordinate triggers an adverse employment action) (emphasis added); Id. at n. 5 
(noting that the Eighth Circuit’s cases support only holding biased subordinates, not 
innocent decision-makers, individually liable under § 1983) (emphasis added).  
153
 See infra Part III.A.1. 
154
 See infra Part III.A.2. 
155
 See infra Part III.A.3. 
156
 See infra Part III.B. 
157
 Id.  
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Despite supporting the Seventh Circuit’s decision, one criticism of the 
court’s decision to expand “cat’s paw” liability to individuals is that it 





A. A Synthesis of Prior Law Supports Expansion 
 
Several reasons support expanding liability in a § 1981 retaliation 
claim to an individual. First, the statute applies to private parties and 
allows individuals to be held liable when a person causes a 
constitutional deprivation.
159
 Section 1981 is similar to § 1983 in this 
way, as both statutes provide a party with a remedy against an 
individual when that individual deprives a party of a constitutional 
right.
160
 Multiple circuits have in fact extended individual liability to 
“cat’s paw” cases pursuant to § 1983.
161 
Further, when a plaintiff 
cannot recover from an employer, as in Smith, fairness supports 
allowing that plaintiff to recover from an individual whose actions 




1. 42 U.S.C. § 1981’s Background 
 
Expanding liability to individuals is supported by statutory law as 
well as by the Seventh Circuit’s prior interpretations. First, the history 
and purpose of § 1981 support extending liability to individuals in the 
employment context. Section 1981 gives all people the right to “make 
and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full 
and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of 
persons and property.”
163
 This statute is designed to protect against 
employment discrimination by private parties despite the statute not 
                                                 
158
 Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 131 S. Ct. 1186 (2011). See infra Part III.C. 
159
 See infra Part III.A.1. 
160




 See infra Part III.A.3. 
163
 42 U.S.C. §1981(a) (1991).  
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specifically mentioning employment contracts.
164
 Congress has never 
assigned a statute of limitations to Section 1981,
165
 but § 1981 falls 
within the federal “catch-all” four-year statute of limitations period.
166
 
Expansion is not new to §1981. In 1991, Congress amended the 
Civil Rights Act to include language to protect the “making, 
performance, modification, and termination of contracts, and the 
enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the 
contractual relationship.”
167
 This Amendment expanded the statute
168
 




Further, this statute is intended to apply to private parties, 
including private citizens, and is not based on state action.
170
 The 
                                                 
164
 Id. at §1981(c). See Waters v. Wis. Steel Works of Int’l Harvester Co., 427 
F.2d 476, 483 (7th Cir. 1970) (stating that the provision of this section that all 
persons within United States shall have same right to make and enforce contracts as 
is enjoyed by white citizens was designed to prohibit private job discrimination, 
even though it does not expressly mention employment contracts). 
165
 29 A.L.R. Fed. 710 (1976) (“Congress has not specifically stated a 
limitation period for causes of action arising under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981.”). 
166
 Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 541 U.S. 369, (2004) (“[T]he 1991 
Act fully qualifies as ‘an Act of Congress enacted after [December 1, 1990]’ within 
the meaning of § 1658.”). See also Dandy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 388 F.3d 263, 
269 (7th Cir. 2004) (The Supreme Court stated in Jones that a hostile work 
environment, wrongful termination, and failure-to-transfer claims under § 1981 were 
governed by § 1658 because these claims were enacted by the 1991 Civil Rights 
Act.). 
167
 Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub.L. No. 102-166 Sect. 101, 105 Stat. 1071, 
codified at 42 U.S.C. Sect. 1981(b). See Jones, 541 U.S. at 383. See also Allen v. 
City of Chi., 828 F.Supp. 543 (N.D. Ill. 1993).  
168
 Mohr v. Chi. Sch. Reform Bd. of Trustees of Bd. of Educ. of City of Chi., 
993 F.Supp. 1155 (N.D.Ill.1998) (stating that § 1981 extended to enjoyment of all 
benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of contractual relationship).  
169
 Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 171 (1989). See Smith v. 
Bray, 681 F.3d 888, 895 (7th Cir. 2012) (The Supreme Court in Patterson gave a 
narrow construction to the phrase “to make and enforce contracts” so that § 1981 did 
not apply to conduct after a contractual relationship had been established.).  
170
 Williams v. Interstate Motor Freight Sys., 458 F.Supp. 20 (S.D. N.Y. 1978); 
See also Wallace v. Brewer, 315 F.Supp. 431, 455 (M.D. Ala.1970) (As citizens of 
22
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Seventh Circuit has found that when a defendant causes or participates 
in constitutional deprivation under § 1981, individual liability is 
appropriate.
171
 Because this statute provides for equal rights of all 
citizens, individuals can be liable if they (1) intentionally cause a 
corporation to infringe on such rights; (2) authorize, direct or 
participate in the alleged discriminatory conduct; or (3) engage in 
discriminatory interference with plaintiff's contractual relationship 
with the employer.
172
 This liability is not limited to supervisors but 
applies to fellow employees as well as corporate officers and directors. 
173
 Expanding on who may be liable, other district courts have found 
that individuals can be liable under § 1981 in a variety of roles, such 
as when the individual is an employee of a corporation,
174
 a defendant 






 or a federal 
                                                                                                                   
United States, plaintiffs had the right under this section relating to equal rights and 
property rights to make and enforce contracts and to own and hold property, and 
such rights were enforceable against private individuals without requirement of state 
action through both injunctive and monetary relief.); Mahone v. Waddle, 564 F.2d 
1018, 1027 (3d Cir. 1977) (Right under this section “to make and enforce contracts” 
can be infringed by private individuals, and it is appropriate that private individuals 
be held liable for that infringement.); Solin v. State Univ. of N.Y., 416 F.Supp. 536, 
539 (S.D. N.Y. 1976) (This section, unlike § 1983 of this title, does not require that 
plaintiff be aggrieved by “person” acting under color of state law.).  
171
 Hildebrandt v. Ill. Dep’t of Natural Res., 347 F.3d 1014, 1039 (7th Cir. 
2003). 
172
 Moffett v. Gene B. Glick Co., Inc., 604 F.Supp. 229, 235 (N.D.Ind. 1984), 
overruled by Reeder-Baker v. Lincoln Nat. Corp., 644 F. Supp. 983 (N.D. Ind. 
1986). 
173
 Id.  
174
 See Coley v. M & M Mars, Inc., 461 F.Supp. 1073, 1076 (M.D. Ga. 1978) 
(Employees of a corporation could be held individually liable under § 1981, that 
guarantees an equal right to make and enforce contracts, for discriminatory 
interference with plaintiff's contractual relationship with the corporate employer, 
despite defendants’ contention that there must be a contractual relationship or 
expectation between themselves and the plaintiff before they could be held liable 
under § 1981.). 
175
 See Allen v. Denver Public Sch. Bd., 928 F.2d 978, 983 (10th Cir. 1991) 
disapproved of by Kendrick v. Penske Transp. Services, Inc., 220 F.3d 1220 (10th 
Cir. 2000) (A claim seeking personal liability in civil rights action under § 1981 
23
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 Therefore, recognizing individual “cat’s paw” liability as 
applied to a human resources manager in a § 1981 suit is a natural 
extension of individual liability under the statute.  
 
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1981’s Similarity to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
 
Next, recognizing individual “cat’s paw” liability under § 1981 is 
reasonable because § 1981 and § 1983 are governed by the same 
standards for intentional discrimination claims,
179
 and other circuits 
have found individual liability for an unlawfully motivated supervisor 
under § 1983.
180
 Section 1983 is implicated in a civil action where 
                                                                                                                   
must be predicated on actor's personal involvement; there must be some affirmative 
link to causally connect the actor with the alleged discriminatory action.). 
176
 See Jones v. Forrest City Grocery Inc., 564 F.Supp.2d 863 (E.D. Ark. 2008) 
(A plaintiff needed to show evidence that the owners of a grocery wholesaler 
personally discriminating against an African-American employee in order to hold 
them individually liable under §1981.). 
177
 See Long v. Marubeni America Corp., 406 F.Supp.2d 285 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) 
(An executive employees’ allegations that a supervisor participated directly in the 
discriminatory conduct against them and made various racist and sexist remarks 
were sufficient to state a discrimination claim against the supervisor under § 1981.). 
See also Amin v. Quad/Graphics, Inc., 929 F.Supp.73 (N.D.N.Y. 1996) (Individual 
supervisors may be found liable for damages under § 1981 and New York Human 
Rights Law if personally involved in the discriminatory conduct and the element of 
personal involvement may be satisfied by proof that the supervisor had knowledge of 
the alleged acts of discrimination and failed to remedy or prevent them.); Habben v. 
City of Fort Dodge, 472 F.Supp.2d 1142 (N.D. Iowa 2007) (Supervisory employees 
can be held individually liable on at least some kinds of race discrimination claims 
pursuant to § 1981.). But see Kaulia v. Cnty. of Maui, Dept. of Pub. Works & Waste 
Mgmt., 504 F.Supp.2d 969 (D. Haw. 2007) (Supervisors could not be held liable 
under § 1981 where they did not personally participate in the discriminatory acts 
which a Hawaiian county employee complained of when the supervisors were not 
aware of nor grossly indifferent to the immediate supervisor's alleged wrongdoing.). 
178
 See Davis v. Reed, 462 F.Supp. 410 413 (W.D. Okla. 1977) (In order to be 
personally liable under this section relating to equal rights under the law for alleged 
acts of race discrimination in federal employment, individual federal officials must 
be directly and personally involved in a deprivation of equal employment rights.). 
179
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either a local government entity, or a state or local government 
employee sued in his or her official capacity deprives an individual of 
“any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and 
laws.”
181
 A cause of action under § 1983 is based on personal liability 
creates personal liability, and § 1983 holds an individual defendant 
liable if he or she caused or participated in constitutional 
deprivation.
182
 Congress sought “to give a remedy to parties deprived 
of constitutional rights, privileges and immunities by an official’s 
abuse of his position,”
183
 and the Supreme Court has held that state 
officials sued in their individual capacities are “persons” under 
§ 1983.
184
 Thus, both § 1983 and §1981 seek to give parties a remedy 
against an individual when that individual deprived them of a 
constitutional right. 
Additionally, multiple federal circuit courts have found that a 
“cat’s paw” theory of liability would support imposing individual 
liability under § 1983 on government employees with unlawful 
motives who cause decision-makers to retaliate.
185
 Even when a circuit 
has not decided this issue, lower courts (1) have chosen to refer to and 
agree with the circuits that have found in favor of “cat’s paw” 
individual liability;
186
 (2) have not yet addressed the issue;
187
 or (3) 
have determined that individual liability exists.
188
 
                                                 
181




 Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 172 (1961), overruled by Monell v. Dep't of 
Soc. Services of City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). 
184
 Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 23 (1991) (stating that the Eleventh 
Amendment does not bar such suits nor are state officers absolutely immune from 
personal liability under § 1983 solely because of the official nature of the acts).  
185
 Smith v. Bray, 681 F.3d 888, 898-899 (7th Cir. 2012). 
186
See Schlier v. Rice, 630 F. Supp. 2d 458, 470 (M.D. Pa. 2007) (Until the 
Third Circuit decides the issue, guidance from other circuits provides that a 
subordinate with a retaliatory motive can be liable if that motive is a catalyst for 
events that lead to an adverse employment action that would not occur otherwise.). 
187
 See Nagle v. Marron, 663 F.3d 100, 118 (2nd Cir. 2011) (The Second 
Circuit has neither accepted nor rejected the cat’s paw approach so the court remands 
the case to the district court.). See also Reynolds v. Fed. Exp. Corp., 09-2692-STA-
cgc, 2012 WL 1107834 (W.D. Tenn. Mar. 31, 2012) on reconsideration, 09-2692-
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In addition to individual liability being proper under § 1981 
because of other courts’ tendency to embrace “cat’s paw” liability 
under § 1983, an inherent sense of fairness requires individual liability 
in cases where an individual has been wronged, the corporation is 
judgment-proof, and holding the individual liable comports with a 
structure approved by Congress.  
The Seventh Circuit stated in Smith that holding a subordinate 
with a retaliatory motive liable as an individual under §1981 made 
sense “as a matter of basic fairness: why should the ‘hapless cat’ (or at 
least his employer) get burned but not the malicious ‘monkey’?”
189
 
Fairness is a powerful motivator for courts to, at times, deviate from 
their proscribed courses, especially when one party is bankrupt. For 
example, in a corporate law case, a trustee in a bankruptcy proceeding 
sued a company owner’s estate for violating the duty of care.
190
 
Typically, the trustee as a debt holder is not owed a fiduciary duty, but 
the court found that a duty of care was owed to the trustee in this case 
                                                                                                                   
STA-CGC, 2012 WL 2089952 (W.D. Tenn. June 8, 2012) (Since Staub, the Sixth 
Circuit has considered “cat’s paw” twice, once under USERRA and once under 
FMLA, but never for individual liability under § 1983; moreover, in this case the 
court found it inappropriate to decide whether “cat’s paw” liability extended to a co-
worker.).  
188
 See Starling v. Bd. of Cnty. Com'rs, 08-80008-CIV-HURLEY, 2009 WL 
281051, at *6 (S.D. Fla. 2009), aff’d, Starling v. Bd. Of Cnty. Com'rs, 602 F.3d 1257 
(11th Cir. 2010) (holding that “cat’s paw” could be a basis for liability and that the 
supervisor’s “role as instigator of the misconduct charges leading to [plaintiff’s] 
demotion creates a potential premise for his individual liability under § 1983”). See 
also Rajaravivarma v. Bd. of Trustees for Conn. State U. Sys., 862 F. Supp. 2d 127, 
167 (D. Conn. 2012) (“The Court applies, without holding, that the cat's paw theory 
of liability is applicable under Section 1981 discrimination claims brought pursuant 
to Section 1983.”). 
189
 Smith v. Bray, 681 F.3d 888, 899 (7th Cir. 2012). See supra text 
accompanying note 136.  
190
 Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814, 816 (N.J. 1981) (Where 
“[t]he primary issue on this appeal is whether a corporate director is personally liable 
in negligence for the failure to prevent the misappropriation of trust funds by other 
directors who were also officers and shareholders of the corporation.”). 
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because the company went into bankruptcy;
191
 therefore, an individual, 
the corporate director, was held personally liable to the trustee.
192
 As 
in Francis, the Seventh Circuit in Smith decided that a plaintiff 
acquires a right that he or she might not have under other 
circumstances
193
 because the plaintiff deserves to be able to hold a 





B. Impact of Seventh Circuit’s “Cat’s Paw” Rule 
 
The Seventh Circuit’s Smith decision extends the Supreme Court’s 
Staub holding by applying “cat’s paw” liability to an individual 
employee. Uncertainties exist, bringing hardship to both plaintiffs and 
defendants in bringing and defending § 1981 “cat’s paw” claims. The 
lower courts have not offered clarification, thus far only 
acknowledging the extension’s existence.
195
 Further, the Seventh 
Circuit’s extension of liability impacts corporations because they now 
have to train and advise their employees not only on how to avoid 
                                                 
191
 Id. at 817.  
192
 Id.  
193
 Smith v. Bray, 681 F.3d 888, 898-899 (7th Cir. 2012). See supra text 
accompanying notes 132-136. 
194
 See Williams v. Banning, 72 F.3d 552, 555 (7th Cir. 1995) (In this Title VII 
case, the plaintiff argued that where an employer is bankrupt or judgment-proof, the 
plaintiff’s only means of recovery is individual liability. The court agreed that 
individual liability would not upset the Title VII structure established by Congress.). 
But see U.S. E.E.O.C. v. AIC Sec. Investigations, Ltd., 55 F.3d 1276, 1282 n. 9 (7th 
Cir. 1995) (In this case involving the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, the 
plaintiff and Equal Employment Opportunity Commission argued that sometimes 
when an employer is bankrupt or judgment-proof, the only way a plaintiff can 
recover is individual liability. The court replied that although though true, being 
judgment-proof is not enough for the court to upset the structure Congress 
established.). 
195
 Golden v. World Sec. Agency, Inc., 10 C 7673, 2012 WL 3151380, at *21 
(N.D. Ill. 2012) (“In contrast to Title VII, an individual may be held liable under 
section 1981 if he caused or participated in the deprivation.”). 
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imputing liability on the corporation through the “cat’s paw” doctrine 
but also how to avoid liability themselves. 
First, a plaintiff might be able to hold a co-worker, not just an 
employee in a supervisory position, individually liable under the “cat’s 
paw” doctrine.
196
 If the lower courts choose to interpret both Judge 
Posner’s and Judge Hamilton’s use of “subordinate”
197
 to include co-
workers, then the “cat’s paw” doctrine vastly opens the door for 
plaintiffs to bring suits against a variety of individuals, not just those 




Second, it has yet to be determined how the court will rule when a 
company is not judgment-proof. When employers and individuals are 
defendants in a lawsuit, if the plaintiff can seek judgment against the 
employer, the court could find that individual liability need not apply 
because another avenue exists to make the plaintiff whole. However, 
in dicta in Smith, the Seventh Circuit seemed to focus on retribution 
against the discriminatory individual, the “monkey,” instead of 
concentrating on making the plaintiff whole.
199
 This focus suggests 
that regardless of whether or not a corporation is judgment-proof, the 
court will still allow a plaintiff to bring a claim against an individual 
because it believes the employee who engaged in discriminatory 
behavior should be required to answer for that behavior. The Seventh 
Circuit believes in fairness. 
Third, the Seventh Circuit’s decision impacts how corporations 
train their employees, particularly their Human Resources Department 
(“HR”) representatives. Corporations now must work harder to train 
their HR employees and then through HR, all other employees to 
ensure employees refrain from being influenced by those who harbor 
                                                 
196
 See supra text accompanying note 64 and Part II.B.2. 
197
 See supra Part II.B.2.   
198
 See supra text accompanying note 49.  
199
 See supra text accompanying notes 136 and 189. See also Smith v. Bray, 
681 F.3d 888, 899 n.5 (7th Cir. 2012) (The Seventh Circuit additionally mentioned 
the Eighth Circuit’s position with regards to § 1983 individual liability: the Eighth 
Circuit holds only biased subordinates, not innocent or duped decision-makers, 
individually liable.).  
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bias. Post Smith, an HR manager is personally liable if there is 
evidence that he or she harbored and acted on an improper motive, 
causing a company decision-maker to take an adverse employment 
action against another employee.
200
 Companies must examine the path 
that an adverse decision takes amongst employees to ensure that bias 
is not at the root of an adverse employment decision; further, 
employees must also delve into the details before bringing an adverse 
employment action against an employee to ensure the decision is not 
tainted.
201
 An additional reason for companies to ensure diligence in 
training employees is that a tainted decision can follow an employee 
for a portion of that employee’s career. If an employee moves to a 
different company, he or she is not automatically immune from “cat’s 
paw” litigation stemming from his or her previous employment. 
Because §1981 claims have a long statute of limitations,
202
 an HR 
employee can still be liable for dismissing an employee years ago at a 
previous company.
203
 Therefore, training to prevent this type of 
liability will become a top priority for companies. 
 
C. Criticism of the Smith decision 
 
A criticism of the Seventh Circuit’s decision is that the court 
improperly expanded “cat’s paw” liability because it did so on a shaky 
foundation: the Staub decision.
204
 The Seventh Circuit relied on 
                                                 
200
 FordHarrison LLP, HR Manager May Be Personally Liable Under Section 
1981, 22 No. 12 Ill. Emp. L. Letter 1 (July 2012). 
201
 See 18 No. 14 Quinlan, HR Compliance Law Bulletin NL 6 (July 15, 2012) 
(Smith opens the door for other employees to file suit against individual Human 
Resources managers and other employees who allegedly have played a role in the 
decision-making process.). 
202
 See supra text accompanying note 166.  
203
 Melissa Maleske, Court applies cat’s paw theory in race-based retaliatory 
claims: 7th Circuit rules employees can be held individually liable for causing their 




 Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 131 S. Ct. 1186 (2011). 
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Staub’s “cat’s paw” liability test, but one can argue that this test did 
little to appease employers and employees alike seeking clarity in 
defending and bringing “cat’s paw” litigation.
205
  
The Supreme Court’s test is arguably problematic on multiple 
levels. First, the Court did not clarify a standard for causation,
206
 but 
instead relied on the already-unclear
207
 proximate cause standard.
208
 
Because of this lack of clarity, lower courts have over-relied on 
analogizing the Staub facts with the facts in the cases before them, 
forcing plaintiffs to provide strong circumstantial evidence of 




The Seventh Circuit applied this arguably unclear holding, meant 
for corporate entities, to individuals without reserve. As seen in Smith, 
even if a plaintiff can overcome Staub’s high hurdles of intent and 
proximate cause, the plaintiff can still fail on other causation 
standards.
210
 Applying the proximate cause standard to determine 
whether an individual is liable on top of other discrimination statutes’ 
causation standards only confuses plaintiffs, employees and employers 
because they are unsure of who is and is not liable under the doctrine. 
Multiple layers of causation within one case promises to lead to 
inconsistent application among the circuit courts. 
Next, the Supreme Court relied on basic tort and agency 
principles to create its new test, instead of clarifying a test from the 
various lower court decisions
211
 or looking to the statutory text.
212
 The 
                                                 
205
 See Covel, supra note 3, at 160. 
206
 Id. at 182.  
207
 Id. at 183. (stating that “the Court failed to clarify what constitutes 
sufficient evidence to establish a direct relation in a situation that by its very nature 
requires more than two parties”). 
208
 Staub, 131 S. Ct. at 1192.  
209
 See Covel, supra note 3, at 183.   
210
 Smith v. Bray, 681 F.3d 888, 899-901 (7th Cir. 2012). 
211
 See id. at 182.  
212
 Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 131 S. Ct. 1186, 1995 (2011) ((Alito, J. concurring) 
(Justice Alito thought the majority’s description of what a plaintiff must show in 
relation to the motivating factor was contrary to the statute’s language.). 
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Court thus chose a route with greater potential for different 
interpretations rather than one of two less ambiguous paths. Moreover, 
even though the Court used agency law to define its test, it left open 
the possibility that “cat’s paw” liability could apply absent an agency 
relationship.
213
 Holding an employee, and possibly a co-worker, liable 
in his or her individual capacity falls away from the agency 
relationship and thus could continue to create confusion as to exactly 
when liability attaches to an employee.  
Finally, the Court’s assertion that an employer still has a defense 
absent a hard-line investigation rule may prove to be employers’ get-
out-of-jail-free card. Smith demonstrated this defense, not under the 
“cat’s paw” inquiry, but rather under the § 1981 inquiry.
214
 The Court 
found that if a plaintiff cannot show a “‘substantial or motivating 
factor’” in the subordinate’s decision to recommend that the decision-
maker terminate the employee, the retaliation claim fails.
215
 Thus, it 
appears that at least in § 1981 retaliation claims, despite the Supreme 
Court refusing to determine a bright-line rule regarding investigations, 
a subordinate escapes “cat’s paw” liability if it finds another reason 




Thus, the Staub opinion and the Smith court’s application of that 
opinion to individual liability leave many important elements open for 
interpretation. The Seventh Circuit should have either (1) resolved 
these areas before moving into uncharted territory and declaring 
individual liability proper under the “cat’s paw” doctrine; or (2) 
created new specifications for when a plaintiff sues an employee in his 
or her individual capacity under “cat’s paw.” However, when the 
                                                 
213
 See Covel, supra note 3, at 182. See Staub, 131 S.Ct. at 1196 (Alito, J. 
concurring) (Justice Alito notes that departing from traditional agency principles by 
leaving open the possibility that a co-worker’s actions could impose liability on an 
employer will create confusion around the “cat’s paw” theory.). 
214
 Smith v. Bray, 681 F.3d 888, 900 (7th Cir. 2012). 
215
 Id. (quoting Culver v. Gorman & Co., 416 F.3d 540, 545 (7th Cir. 2005)).  
216
 See Covel, supra note 3, at 186 (The Court chose not to adopt a bright-line 
independent investigation rule to indemnify employers, but an employer can still 
assert an “unrelated reason” for the adverse employment action as a defense.). 
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Seventh Circuit employed the proximate cause standard in Smith, it 
simply determined that proximate cause existed;
217
 this clean, quick 
finding of proximate cause could signal that the court wants an 






To conclude, the Seventh Circuit correctly ruled that an employee 
harboring a discriminatory animus is individually liable when he or 
she intends his or her conduct to be, and whose conduct is, the 
proximate cause of an adverse employment action against another 
employee. The rule conforms with the history of § 1981, follows 
reasonably from the rationale for holding individuals liable under the 
“cat’s paw” doctrine in § 1983 cases, and flows from an inherent sense 
of fairness. Thus, the monkey is no longer immune from the dire 
consequences of his behavior; he is finally held responsible for his 
actions. 
                                                 
217
 Smith v. Bray, 681 F.3d 888, 900 (7th Cir. 2012). 
218
 A simpler proximate cause analysis prevents courts from feeling the 
compulsion to narrowly conform a case’s facts to those in Staub in order to find 
“cat’s paw” liability. See supra text accompanying note 209. 
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